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Abstract
This paper examines whether noise trading has signicant impacts on the cross-section of stock 
returns by analyzing the relationship between the trading activity of individual investors and future 
stock returns. I nd that stocks heavily sold by individual investors outperform stocks heavily 
purchased by 0.73 percent per month, which is more pronounced among rms with stronger limits to 
arbitrage. These ndings are in accord with the predictions of noise trader models in which the 
systematic activities of noise traders affect stock returns when they trade in concert and there is 
limitation to the activities of rational arbitrageurs.
Keywords: Individual investor, Noise trader, Behavioral nance
JEL classification: G10; G12; G14
1.  Introduction
The question of whether noise traders significantly distort asset prices has been a much debated topic 
for decades. Under the traditional finance paradigm, the current price of a stock closely reflects the 
rationally discounted value of expected cash flows, in which the cross-section of expected returns 
depends only on the cross-section of systematic risks. Even if there are irrational investors in the 
market, rational arbitrageurs cancel out the demand of irrational investors, which results in no 
significant impacts of irrationality on security prices. In contrast, there is an alternative view that 
noise traders have important roles in the formation of securities prices. 1 Correlated behaviors of 
noise traders and limits to arbitrage prevent rational investors from fully absorbing correlated shocks 
of noise trading, which induce commonality in stock returns other than systematic risks and thereby 
generate the cross-sectional difference in stock returns.
This study examines whether noise trading has significant impacts on the cross-section of stock 
returns. More specifically, this paper analyzes the future returns to portfolios with buying or selling 
pressures of individual investors, who are likely to be regarded as noise traders in most theoretical 
1  Shleifer and Summers (1990), De Long et al. (1990), De Long et al. (1991), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) document 
that rational and informed traders face risks that are likely to limit their actions if noise trading infuences securities prices, 
even in the markets where some investors are rational and informed. Without limits to their actions, the effect of noise 
trading would soon diminish because rational and informed investors arbitrage against the mispricing due to the presence of 
irrational noise traders.
4Individual investor flows and cross-section of stock returns:Evidence from Japan
models. 2 The main finding in this paper is that stocks with a strong selling pressure of individual 
investors outperform stocks with a strong buying pressure of individual investors. In other words, 
stocks that individual investors choose to include in their portfolios are more likely to underperform 
in the subsequent period.
To construct the measure of noise trading pressure of a particular stock, I use annual share-
ownership data of listed firms in the Japanese stock markets, which provide the number of shares 
held by some investor groups: individual investors (including members of manage rial boards), 
governments, brokerage firms, financial institutions, corporations, and foreign individuals and 
institutions. As all Japanese listed firms are mandated to disclose their share ownership profiles at 
the end of the fiscal year, this study can conduct a more robust empirical examination of the noise 
trading effect on stock prices with broader observations. Furthermore, although the data provide 
information on trading behaviors less frequently (only annually), the advantage of this data is to 
identify trading behaviors of noise traders, namely, individual investors more accurately than 
previous studies. For each stock, I calculate the change in individual investors’ holdings, excluding 
managerial boards’ holdings from the end of the last fiscal year to the end of the current fiscal year, 
which is divided by shares outstanding to normalize across stocks. The variable is defined as the net 
individual investor trading flow (NIF). Firms with strong individual buying pressure (high NIF) are 
more likely to have small market capitalizations, low one-year cumulative returns during the change, 
and high book-to-market ratios than firms with strong individual selling pressure (low NIF).
Using the net individual investor trading flow (NIF), I construct five value-weighted NIF 
portfolios each month. In each month, stocks are sorted into five value-weighted portfolios according 
to NIF as measured over a year prior to the latest end of fiscal year from the portfolio formation date. 
When performance is measured by Jensen’s alpha, stocks heavily sold by individual investors do not 
outperform or underperform stocks heavily purchased. In contrast, when performance is measured 
by a five-factor model’s alpha, results show that stocks heavily sold by individual investors 
outperform stocks heavily purchased by 0.73 percent per month, that is, about 8.8 percent per annum. 
This finding indicates that systematic behaviors of noise traders also have important roles in the 
formation of securities prices. In addition, I find that the NIF long-short portfolio has a positive 
factor loading on a value factor. This finding indicates that investment tilts of individual investors 
toward value stocks contribute to the improvement of the market-adjusted return on the NIF 
longshort portfolio. The results in this study remain unchanged in subsample analyses and other 
robustness checks. Using the annual ownership change of individual investors in Japan, this study 
first confirms the existence of a strong relation between the trading behaviors of individual investors 
and future stock returns. 3 
This study also tests whether the difference of diffculty to arbitrage affects the relationship 
between noise trading and subsequent stock returns. Theoretically, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
2  Recent empirical studies on individual investors also lend empirical support for the relevance for their irrationality. For 
example, individuals have the tendency to trade too much (Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001), realize capital 
gains quickly but hold onto capital losses (Odean, 1998), and hold underdiversfied portfolios (Goetzmann and Kumar, 
2008). In addition, their trading behaviors are correlated and persistent, which generates a systematic component in stock 
returns (Kumar and Lee, 2006; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009).
3  Although Kim and Nofsinger (2007) conduct a similar analysis for this study, they fail to nd that stocks heavily sold by 
individual investors outperform stocks that are heavily purchased. Instead, they find the opposite result. While I exclude 
managerial ownership included in individual ownership in this study, they do not. When managers sell stocks they own to 
individual investors, the raw value of individual ownership does not change. However, as managers are corporate insiders 
rather than noise traders, the exclusion of managerial ownership is more preferable to calculate a more accurate proxy 
for the trading behaviors of noise traders. The failure to exclude managerial ownership from individual ownership might 
generate the difference between their paper and this paper.
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document that some limits to arbitrage must exist for mispricing to persist in the presence of 
sophisticated professional investors. The effect of noise trading on stock prices varies according to 
the degree to which it is diffcult for rational investors to arbitrage. In recent empirical studies, 
financial anomalies are found to be more pronounced among firms with higher idiosyncratic risks 
(Pontiff, 1996; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Ali, Hwang, and Trombley, 2003; Mendenhall, 
2004; Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2005) and stricter short-sale constraints (Chen, Hong, 
and Stein, 2002; Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; Jones and Lamont, 2002; Lamont, 2004; 
Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw, 2004; Reed, 2003; Nagel, 2005). Therefore, I employ two measures 
of limits to arbitrage, idiosyncratic risk and residual institutional ownership (a proxy for short-sale 
constraints). 4  I find that the difference in returns between the lowest NIF portfolio and the highest 
NIF portfolio is stronger among firms with stronger limits to arbitrage. In particular, when I use a 
proxy for short-sale constraints as the measure of limits to arbitrage, the return differ ence between 
the lowest NIF portfolio and the highest NIF portfolio among firms with lower short-sale constraints 
(higher residual institutional ownership) is no longer significant, while the return difference is still 
significant among higher short-sale constraints. The findings indicate that stocks with strong 
purchase pressures tend to be overpriced and experience underperformance in the subsequent year. 
The underperformance is found to persist over a year when rational investors cannot fully arbitrage 
away mispricing.
This paper is related to a growing literature in behavioral finance that examines the impact of 
individual investor behaviors on future stock returns. In similar veins, Hvidkjaer (2008) and Barber, 
Odean, and Zhu (2006) find that stocks with strong retail investor buying over the prior year 
underperform those with strong retail investor selling by analyzing small trades in transactions data. 5 
Frazzini and Lamont (2008) find that stocks favored by retail investors tend to underperform stocks 
out of favor in subsequent years by studying the effect of individual investors via mutual fund flows 
on stock returns. Because there is little evidence on the relation between behaviors of noise traders 
and future stock returns, further examinations of the issue are needed. In this respect, this study 
contributes to the existing literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines a proxy for noise trading, that 
is, the net individual investor trading. This section also provides data descriptions used in this study. 
In Section 3, I report characteristics and abnormal returns for the main test portfolios. Concluding 
remarks are presented in Section 4.
2.  Data
2.1.  Primary data
I obtain annual share-ownership data to measure the trading behaviors of noise traders from Nikkei 
NEEDS. In Japan, according to the Commercial Code, firms are mandated to report their shareholder 
profile in their formal annual reports to the stock exchanges. The shareholder profile contains the 
number of shares held by individual investors (including members of managerial boards), 
governments, brokerage firms, financial institutions, corporations, and foreign individuals and 
4  Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) and Nagel (2005) use (residual) institutional ownership as a measure for short-sale 
constraints. The rationale for these studies’ using institutional ownership is that the degree of institutional ownership 
explains much of the variation in the loan supply across stocks and that stocks with low institutional ownership are more 
expensive to borrow. D’Avolio (2002) shows that the main suppliers of stock loans are institutional investors.
5  Although Hvidkjaer (2008) and Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2006) use the same transaction data, the former uses signed 
small-trade share volume and constructs the measure as the shares bought less shares sold divided by shares outstanding, 
while the latter construct the measure of order imbalances as the proportion of signed small trades that are purchases.
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institutions. Using the data, I construct a variable that captures the trading behaviors of noise traders. 
In this paper, noise trading is computed as the change in individual investors’ holdings, excluding 
managerial boards’ holdings, from the end of the last fiscal year to the end of the current fiscal year. 
As managerial board members are considered to be corporate insiders among individual investors 
rather than noise traders, I deduct managerial holdings from shares held by individual investors. To 
normalize across stocks, I divide the change in individual investors’ holdings, excluding managerial 
boards’ holdings, by share outstanding. I define the variable as net individual investor trading flow 
(NIF).
Table 1 reports summary statistics of NIF. The table describes the time-series average of means, 
medians, standard deviations, skewness, 20th-percentile values, and 80th-percentile values of NIF. 
The first five rows in Table 1 show summary statistics in some selective years. As can be seen in 
these rows, the trading behaviors of individual investors are quite different across time. While 
individual investors decrease their holdings in 1985 and 1990, they increase their holdings in 1995 
and 2000. While the odd moments of NIF are different across time, the standard deviation of NIF is 
stable across time.
Table 1.
Data descriptions on individual investor trading flow. This table reports summary statistics for the net 
individual investor trading flow (NIF). The NIF is defined as the change of individual investors’ holdings, 
excluding managerial boards’ holdings, from the end of the last fiscal year to the end of the current fiscal year. 
The table reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, skewness, and the 
first and fifth quintiles for selected years and for the entire period.
Year Mean Median StDev Skew P20 P80
1985 -0.011 -0.004 0.044 -1.166 -0.034 0.012
1990 -0.014 -0.008 0.040 -0.676 -0.039 0.011
1995 0.004 0.001 0.034 4.455 -0.011 0.016
2000 0.017 0.012 0.045 1.376 -0.003 0.041
2005 -0.006 -0.006 0.048 1.594 -0.032 0.015
1980-2008 0.001 0.001 0.040 0.197 -0.019 0.020
2.2.  Market and financial data
Market and financial data are also obtained from Nikkei NEEDS. Using the data, I calculate excess 
returns over the government bond (i.e., risk-free) rate and returns on factormimicking portfolios 
used in time-series regressions. When I calculate returns on factormimicking portfolios used in time-
series regressions, I include the excess of value-weighted market returns listed in the Japanese stock 
markets over the risk-free rate, a size factor, a book-to-market ratio factor, a momentum factor 
(Carhart, 1997), and a liquidity factor suggested by Pastor and Stambough (2003). In the construction 
of these factors, I employ a similar method to Fama and French (1993). The size and book-to-market 
factors are calculated by taking the value-weighted average of the top three deciles in terms of 
market capitalization and book-to-market portfolio returns and subtracting the average portfolio 
returns of the bottom three deciles. To calculate size and book-to-market factors, I employ the top 
three and the bottom three deciles in terms of firm market capitalization and book-to-market ratios 
as listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) as breakpoints to divide stocks into three portfolios. In 
these constructions, the market capitalization at the end of the previous month as well as the book-
to-market ratio based on the most recently announced book equity value are used. The momentum 
and liquidity factors are calculated by taking the value-weighted average of the upper quintile in 
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terms of momentum and liquidity portfolio returns and subtracting the average of the lower quintile 
portfolio returns. In the construction of the momentum factor, the previous three months of 
cumulative returns are used. Following Pastor and Stambough (2003), I calculate the liquidity ratio 
and construct the liquidity factor based on these values. 6 
2.3. Sample selection
The sample used in this study covers all ordinary common stock listed in the Japanese stock markets. 
The sample period ranges from April 1980 to March 2008, in which annual ownership data, market 
and financial data are suffciently available. As in many previous studies, I exclude financial firms 
and regulated utilities from the analysis. I also omit firms with stock prices lower than 50 yen, and 
insufficient observations on data used in this study are excluded. Furthermore, I exclude firms that 
experience large-scale increases or decreases of their outstanding stock during the period from the 
end of the last fiscal year to that of the current fiscal year. NIF does not always increase or decrease 
because of trading behaviors of individual investors. For example, private equity placements to a 
small number of institutions increase their ownership and decrease the ownership of individual 
investors. If the scale of private equity placements is large, the trading behaviors of individual 
investors are less likely to contribute to changes in NIF. Stock repurchases, stock splits, and reverse 
splits also increase/decrease NIF regardless of individual investor trading. To avoid these effects, I 
exclude from this analysis firms showing more than 10 percent increases/decreases of their 
outstanding. This exclusion process also contributes to separating the effect of noise trading on the 
cross-section of stock returns from the effect of change in outstanding (Pontiff and Woodgate, 2008). 
The sample of firms used in this study ranges from a minimum of 998 in 1980 to a maximum of 
2,897 in 2008.
3.  Empirical results
3.1.  Characteristics of NIF-sorted portfolios
I begin by explaining the construction of the NIF portfolios. I construct five NIF portfolios each 
month. In each month, stocks are sorted into five value-weighted portfolios according to NIF as 
measured over a year prior to the latest fiscal year end from the portfolio formation date. Table 2 
reports the characteristics of the NIF-sorted portfolios. As can be seen in the table, high NIF firms 
are more likely to have low individual ownerships, small market capitalizations, low cumulative 
stock returns, and high book-to-market ratios. The results indicate that individual investors have 
tendencies to purchase (sell) smaller (larger), value (growth), recently low (high) performing stocks. 
The investment style tilts of individual investors might complement those of institutions, in particular, 
foreign investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) document that foreign investors, which are predominantly 
institutions, in Japanese equity markets prefer large growth stocks.
6  Following Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity ratio, I calculate a stock’s liquidity, which is measured by the 
interaction between returns and lagged-order flow. As prices of less liquid stocks are expected to overshoot in response 
to the order  flow, the greater value in predicted return reversal for a given dollar volume implies a lower level of stock 
liquidity. To calculate this measure, I regress a market-adjusted return for a given firm on the lagged stock return and the 
interaction term of the stock’s daily yen volume and the sign of the lagged stock return. The coefficient of the interaction 
term is expected to be negative and larger in absolute magnitude if the firm’s adverse selection problem is severe.
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Table 2.
Firm characteristics within each NIF quintile. This table reports firm characteristics within each NIF quintile. 
Quintiles are formed monthly based on the NIF at the latest end of the fiscal year. All characteristics are 
equally weighted within each quintile, and the table presents averages across formation periods. The table 
reports the time-series average of the NIF, individual holdings (defined as individual investors’ holdings 
excluding managerial boards’ holdings), market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cumulative returns(CR) 
measured over a year during the change, turnover ratio, and stock prices. The last two columns in the table 
report the difference between the high and low NIF portfolios for each charactesistic, along with the Newey-
West adjusted t-statistics.
NIF 1(L) 2 3 4 5(H) 1-5 t(1-5)
change in ind.hold -0.047 -0.011 0.001 0.012 0.050 -0.097 -48.57
individual holding 0.329 0.287 0.285 0.292 0.292 0.036 8.84
marketcapitalization(millionyen) 123,506 126,213 94,144 81,392 80,251 43,255 7.35
book-tomarket 0.669 0.774 0.844 0.860 0.860 -0.191 -7.36 
CR during the change 0.391 0.138 0.051 -0.006 -0.062 0.453 21.46
Turnover 0.051 0.034 0.027 0.032 0.047 0.004 2.51
Price(yen) 6,567 3,466 4,454 3,167 5,061 1,507 2.40
3.2.  Returns on NIF sorted portfolios
The main question addressed in this paper is whether NIF, that is, buying or selling pressures of 
individual investors, has explanatory power to predict future stock returns. This section examines this 
predication by analyzing the return difference between stocks within the lowest NIF quintile and 
stocks within the highest NIF quintile.
Panel A of Table 3 report Jensen’s alphas of five value-weighted NIF portfolios. T-statistics 
described below coefficients are computed using Newey-West adjusted standard errors with four 
lags. As can be seen in the first row of Panel B, the lowest NIF portfolio shows a value of 0.475 
percent with a t-statistic of 2.60. On the other hand, the highest NIF portfolio shows a value of 0.559 
percent with a t-statistic of 2.06. The return difference between the lowest- and highest NIF portfolios 
is -0.083 percent with a t-statistic of -0.55, which is presented in the last column. The results indicate 
that individual investor behaviors are not useful for predicting future stock returns. However, as 
documented in Section 3.1, individuals have the tendency to tilt their investments toward small, 
value stocks, and recent losing stocks. To control the effect of their investment tilts, I employ a five-
factor model and characteristics-adjusted returns (Daniel et al., 1997) in empirical analyses.
Subsequently, I report five-factor model alphas on NIF portfolios. Panel B of Table 3 reports 
five-factor model alphas and factor loadings of five value-weighted NIF portfolios. The table also 
presents five-factor model alphas and factor loadings of the portfolio, longing stocks within the 
lowest NIF quintile and shorting stocks within the highest NIF quintile. As can be seen in the first 
row of Panel B, the lowest NIF portfolio shows a value of 0.230 percent with a t-statistic of 2.07. On 
the other hand, the highest NIF portfolio shows a value of -0.514 percent with a t-statistic of -3.81. 
The return difference between the lowest and highest NIF portfolios is 0.744 percent with a t-statistic 
of 3.77, which is presented in the last column. That is, stocks heavily purchased by individual 
investors significantly underperform the market, while stocks heavily sold by individual investors 
significantly outperform the market.
Furthermore, I find that the portfolio long the lowest NIF stocks and short the highest NIF 
stocks have statistically significant loadings on a value factor (HML) and a momentum factor 
(WML). The loading on a value factor is negative, while the loading on a momentum factor is 
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positive. As shown in Section 3.1, individuals have tendencies to tilt their investments toward value 
stocks and recent losers. Although I find an insignificant negative Jensen’s alpha of the long-short 
NIF portfolio, the tilt toward value stocks simply help the portfolio perform well. During the sample 
period in this study, the value factor shows a monthly average return of 1.015 percent. 7 At the first 
glance, it seems that stocks heavily purchased by individual investors do not outperform or 
underperform stocks heavily sold by individual investors. However, after controlling the effect of 
investment tilts, I can find that stocks heavily purchased by individual investors underperform stocks 
heavily sold by individual investors.
Factor model adjusted alphas on NIF portfolios. This table presents the monthly factor model adjusted alphas 
on the value-weighted portfolios in each NIF quintile and the value-weighted portfolios that are long the 
lowest NIF portfolio and short the highest NIF portfolio. Quintiles are formed monthly from April 1980 to 
March 2008 based on the NIF at the end of the latest fiscal year. Panel A reports the monthly Jensen’s alphas, 
while Panel B reports five-factor model alphas, factor loadings, and adjusted R2 values (reported in percent). 
Alphas are in monthly percentages, and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are shown below the coefficient 
estimates.
NIF 1(L) 2 3 4 5(H) 1-5
Panel A: CAPM
Intercept
0.475
(2.60)
0.678
(3.25) 
0.857
(3.58)
0.810
(3.04)
0.559
(2.06)
-0.083
(-0.55)
Panel B: 5-factor
Intercept
0.230
(2.07) 
-0.067
(-0.70)
-0.189
(-1.98)
-0.137
(-1.12)
-0.514
(-3.81)
0.744
(3.77)
Mkt 1.001(43.93)
0.962
(49.80)
0.958
(34.51)
0.958
(33.03)
1.014
(35.53)
-0.013
(-0.34)
SMB 0.028(0.70)
-0.025
(-0.72)
0.006
(0.13)
0.146
(2.97)
0.154
(2.64)
-0.125
(-1.43)
HML -0.121(-2.66)
0.105
(2.65)
0.201
(3.94)
0.242
(4.80)
0.329
(5.52)
-0.449
(-4.87)
WML 0.024(1.08)
0.022
(0.97)
-0.048
(-1.62)
-0.041
(-1.39)
-0.109
(-2.88)
0.133
(2.66)
LIQ 0.241(3.04)
-0.154
(-1.58)
-0.253
(-2.58)
-0.082
(-0.85)
0.034
(0.33)
0.207
(1.42)
Adj. R2 89.75 87.58 86.52 87.05 84.92 47.23
Table 3.
3.3.  Robustness
3.3.1.  Equal-weighted NIF portfolios
Panel A of Table 4 reports five-factor model alphas on equally weighted NIF portfolios. As the 
construction of value-weighted portfolios, I construct five equally weighted NIF portfolios. As can be 
seen in the last column, the lowest NIF portfolio outperforms the highest NIF portfolio by 0.303 with 
a t-statistic of 2.43. Although the return difference is smaller and less reliable than the return on the 
value-weighted portfolio, the results are consistent with the main results.
3.3.2.  NIF portfolios sorted by individual ownership
The absolute change in individual investors’ ownership is considered to depend on their initial 
ownership level. For example, a five-percent change of NIF is more likely in firms with a larger initial 
ownership. Actually, as shown in the second row of Table 2, the lowest NIF portfolio, which 
7  Asness, Moskowittz, and Pedersen (2008) document that the value effect in Japan is pronounced compared to U.S., U.K., 
and Europe. The value premium in Japan is 11.6 percent per annum during the period from January 1985 to February 2008.
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experiences the largest change in ownership, has the largest initial ownership among other four NIF 
portfolios. To control the effect of the initial ownership level, for each month, I divide the entire 
sample into the bottom 50 percent and the top 50 percent based on individual ownership at the 
previous fiscal year end and then construct five NIF portfolios. Panels B and C of Table 4 present 
five-factor model alphas on value-weighted NIF portfolios. As can be seen in the last column, among 
both firms with high individual ownership and firms with low individual ownership, the lowest NIF 
portfolios outperform the highest NIF portfolios. In the case of firms with high individual ownership, 
the difference in returns is 0.532 (0.435) with a t-statistic of 2.58 (2.02), which is consistent with the 
main results.
Robustness checks. This table reports the five-factor model’s alphas for the NIF portfolios. Panel A reports 
results when I use equally weighted portfolios instead of value-weighted ones. Panels B and C report results 
for subsamples based on individual investors’ ownership levels. The breakpoint is the median ownership at 
the latest fiscal year-end. Panels D and E report results for subsamples in which I simply divide the entire 
sample period into two halves. Panel F reports the results when I employ characteristics-adjusted returns 
(Daniel et al., 1997). Panel G reports the results for NIF normalized by trading volume. Alphas are in monthly 
percentages, while the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.
NIF 1(L) 2 3 4 5(H) 1-5
A. Equal-weighted portfolio 0.226(2.87)
0.298
(4.19)
0.366
(5.05)
0.251
(3.28)
-0.077
(-0.91)
0.303
(2.43)
B. High ind. own. 0.176(1.06)
-0.089
(-0.48)
-0.135
(-0.89)
-0.198
(-1.39)
-0.356
(-2.30)
0.532
(2.58)
C. Low ind. own. 0.168(1.44)
0.031
(0.31)
-0.057
(-0.57)
-0.070
(-0.52)
-0.268
(-1.86)
0.435
(2.02)
D. 1980-1994 0.361(2.00)
-0.175
(-1.20)
-0.361
(-2.74)
-0.202
(-1.12)
-0.539
(-2.94)
0.900
(3.17)
E. 1994-2008 0.123(1.09)
-0.167
(-1.29)
-0.082
(-0.52)
-0.175
(-1.01)
-0.486
(-2.92)
0.609
(2.59)
F. DGTW char-adj. 0.146(1.50)
0.009
(0.09)
-0.074
(-0.67)
0.102
(0.92)
-0.216
(-1.47)
0.362
(1.86)
G. Normalize by trading volume 0.221(1.76)
-0.041
(-0.46)
-0.212
(-1.84)
-0.259
(-2.06)
-0.183
(-1.14)
0.404
(1.92)
Table 4.
3.3.3.  Subsample period analysis
I also examine whether the return difference between two NIF portfolios persists in two subsample 
periods that are simply divided into two halves. Panels D and E of Table 4 present five-factor model 
alphas on value-weighted NIF portfolios in the period from April 1980 to March 1994 and from April 
1994 to March 2008. As can be seen in the last column, the lowest NIF portfolios outperform the 
highest NIF portfolios in both periods. The return difference shows a value of 0.900 percent with a 
t-statistic of 3.17 in the former period, while the difference in the latter period shows a value of 0.609 
percent with a t-statistic of 2.59. Although the return difference is small and less reliable in the latter 
period than in the former period, the main results in this paper remain unchanged.
3.3.4.  Characteristics-adjusted returns on NIF portfolios
Panel F of Table 4 shows characteristic-adjusted returns on value-weighted NIF portfolios. In the 
calculation of the characteristic-adjusted return, I follow a procedure similar to the approach used by 
Daniel et al. (1997, DGTW). Specifically, I divide each stock into three portfolios based on its market 
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capitalization at the end of the previous month, its book-to-market ratio based on its most recently 
announced book equity value, and its previous three months of cumulative returns. Using the same 
breakpoints used in the factor adjustments, I divide all stocks into the top three, middle four, and 
bottom three portfolios for market capitalization and book-to-market classifications. In the case of 
momentum classification, all stocks are divided into the top quintile, the bottom quintile, and all 
others. Therefore, I construct three size, three book-to-market, and three momentum categories, 
which result in 27 possible classifications for each stock. I calculate monthly value-weighted average 
returns for each of these 27 stock classifications, taking the characteristic-adjusted return of a 
particular stock as its realized return minus the average return of a stock with its classification. As can 
be seen in the last column of Panel F of Table 4, the lowest NIF portfolio outperforms the highest NIF 
portfolio by 0.362 with a t-statistic of 1.86. Although the return difference is more statistical reliable 
when I use five-factor model alphas, the main results remain substantially unchanged when I employ 
other risk adjustment models.
3.3.5.  NIF normalized by trading volume
Up to this section, I use the change in individual investor holdings normalized by shares outstanding 
as the proxy for noise trading. In this section, instead of the measure, I use the change of individual 
investor holdings normalized by trading volume during the change. Panel G of Table 4 presents five-
factor model alphas on value-weighted portfolios. As can be seen in the last column, the return 
difference between the lowest NIF portfolio and the highest NIF portfolio is 0.404 percent per month 
with a t-statistic of 1.92. Compared to NIF normalized by shares outstanding, although the difference 
in returns and its statistical significance weaken, these values provide empirical support for the main 
results in this paper.
3.4  Limits to arbitrage
For mispricing to persist in the presence of sophisticated professional investors, some limits to 
arbitrage must exist (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this section, I investigate whether two proxies for 
limits to arbitrage, namely, idiosyncratic risk and institutional ownership, affect the return predictability 
of NIF. If the return predictability of NIF is in accordance with the investor sentiment story, mispricing 
is more prominent among firms with higher limits to arbitrage.
3.4.1  Idiosyncratic risk
When investors are limited to arbitrage mispricing opportunities, NIF predicts stronger price reversals. 
To measure the extent of the limits to arbitrage, I employ the simplest measure, namely, idiosyncratic 
risk. According to several papers such as Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), Ali, Hwang, and Trombley 
(2003), Mendenhall (2004), Mushruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006), and Pontiff (2006), stocks 
with high levels of idiosyncratic risk are more diffcult to arbitrage. In fact, some previous studies in 
this area show that idiosyncratic risk is highly correlated with more sophisticated measures. 
Specifically, I use the standard deviation of the monthly residual from a time-series regression of the 
firms’ excess returns on the Fama-French three factors over the 36 months preceding the end of our 
ranking period as our measure of idiosyncratic risk. I then separately analyze return patterns by 
confining stocks to the bottom 50 percent and top 50 percent based on this measure of idiosyncratic
risk.
Panels A and B of Table 5 report five-factor model alphas on value-weighted NIF portfolios, 
which are first sorted by idiosyncratic risk. As can be seen in the last column of the table, when the 
sample is confined to firms with higher idiosyncratic risks, the lowest NIF portfolio outperforms the 
highest NIF portfolio by 0.619 percent with a t-statistic of 2.95. On the other hand, when the sample 
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is confined to firms with the lower idiosyncratic risks, the lowest NIF portfolio outperforms the 
highest NIF portfolio by 0.444 percent with a t-statistic of 2.43, which is smaller and less reliable than 
firms with the higher idiosyncratic risks. That is, firms with stricter limits to arbitrage are more likely 
to generate the higher difference in returns, which is consistent with the investor sentiment story. 
However, even when the sample is confined to firms with lower idiosyncratic risk, the return difference 
between the two NIF portfolios is still statistically significant. Idiosyncratic risk is used in empirical 
analyses not only to represent a limit to arbitrage but also as a sign of informed trading. 8 In the latter 
case, the level of mispricing declines in idiosyncratic risk. The noisiness of the idiosyncratic risk 
measure might contribute to the results.
NIF and the degree of limits to arbitrage. This table presents the monthly five-factor model alphas for the NIF 
value-weighted portfolios after dividing all stocks into two groups, according to the degree of the limits to 
arbitrage. Panels A and B report the results for subsamples based on idiosyncratic risk, which is defined as the 
monthly residual from a time-series regression of the firms’ excess returns on the Fama-French three factors 
over the 36 months preceding the end of our ranking period. The breakpoint is the median idiosyncratic risk 
at the formation date. Panels A and B report results for subsamples based on residual institutional ownership. 
Residual ownership is calculated as the residual by regressing logit-transformed institutional ownership on 
the logarithm of market capitalization as well as the squared logarithm of market capitalization each month. 
The breakpoint is the median residual ownership at the formation date. Alphas are in monthly percentages, 
and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.
NIF 1(L) 2 3 4 5(H) 1-5
A. High idio. risk 0.203(1.56)
-0.252
(-1.32)
-0.303
(-1.75)
-0.480
(-3.07)
-0.416
(-2.33)
0.619
(2.95)
B. Low idio. risk 0.233(1.73)
-0.028
(-0.26)
-0.035
(-0.31)
0.015
(0.13)
-0.211
(-1.70)
0.444
(2.43)
C. High residual inst. own. 0.030(0.29)
0.049
(0.36)
-0.327
(-2.85)
-0.229
(-1.81)
-0.192
(-1.16)
0.222
(1.02)
D. Low residual inst. own. 0.419(3.39)
0.043
(0.38)
0.052
(0.48)
-0.028
(-0.22)
-0.488
(-3.19)
0.907
(4.01)
Table 5.
3.4.2  Short-sale constraints
Short-sale constraints are a kind of limit to arbitrage. As Miller (1977) documents, short-sale 
constraints can prevent pessimistic opinions from being expressed in prices. When there is a 
divergence of opinions in the market regarding the value of an asset , optimistic investors will end up 
holding overpriced assets. In empirical studies, institutional ownership is the most frequently used 
proxy for short-sale constraints. 9 Following Nagel (2005), I employ residual institutional ownership 
as the proxy for short-sale constraints. After performing a logit transformation of institutional 
ownership that is bounded by 0 and 1, I regress logittransformed institutional ownership on a logarithm 
8  Pantzalis and Park (2006) find that that the level of mispricing declines with idiosyncratic volatility, which supports the 
notion that greater levels of firm-specific risk reflect greater participation of informed traders in the market for the stock. 
However, they also find that the relationship is U-shaped, with mispricing increasing with idiosyncratic risk for stocks with 
high levels of idiosyncratic volatility.
9  D’Avolio (2002) finds that the degree of institutional ownership explains 55 percent of cross-sectional variation in loan 
supply and is its most important determinant.
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of market capitalization as well as on a squared logarithm of market capitalization. 10 Regressions are 
run each month by using the latest value of institutional ownership. I refer to the residuals as residual 
institutional ownership. I then separately analyze return patterns by confining stocks to the bottom 50 
percent and the top 50 percent based on the residual institutional ownership.
Panels C and D of Table 5 report five-factor model alphas on value-weighted NIF portfolios, 
which are first sorted by residual institutional ownership. As can be seen in the last column of the 
table, when the sample is confined to firms with the higher level of residual institutional ownership, 
the lowest NIF portfolio only outperforms the highest NIF portfolio by 0.222 percent, with a 
t-statistic of 1.02. On the other hand, when the sample is confined to firms with the lower residual 
institutional ownership, the lowest NIF portfolio outperforms the highest NIF portfolio by 0.907 
percent with a t-statistic of 4.01. In other words, the level of mispricing strengthens in the level of 
short-sale constraints.
4.  Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of noise trading on the cross-section of stock returns. Using the 
annual ownership change of individual investors as a proxy for noise trading, I provide two important 
results. First, I find that stocks heavily sold by individual investors outperform stocks heavily 
purchased by 0.73 percent per month, that is, about 8.8 percent per annum. This finding indicates 
that systematic behaviors of noise traders also have important roles in the formation of securities 
prices. Second, I find that the outperformance of stocks heavily sold by individual investors over 
stocks heavily purchased by them is stronger among firms with stronger limits to arbitrage. In 
particular, the tendencies are more pronounced when I use a proxy for short-sale constraints as the 
measure of limits to arbitrage. The findings indicate that stocks with strong purchase pressures tend 
to be overpriced and experience underperformance in the subsequent year. Collectively, these 
findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of noise trader models in which the systematic 
activities of individual investors affect the returns of those stocks in which they are concentrated and 
the limits to arbitrage are stricter.
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